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Abstract 
We examine the level of earnings conservatism in government-linked companies, where significant ownership and 
control lies in the hands of federal or state government. We assess conservative practice using the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings model introduced by Basu (1997). The sample in this study includes 234 government-linked 
companies and 1122 widely held companies listed on Bursa Malaysia over the period 2005 to 2010. Our results show 
that, in contrast to widely held companies, government-linked companies are not conservative when preparing their 
financial statements. Further analysis that divides government-linked companies into companies under federal 
government control and those under state government control shows that the conservatism level between the two 
groups varies. Unlike federal-government-controlled companies, state-controlled companies recognised bad news in a 
more timely way than they recognised good news. Our findings are in line with the claims that managers in 
government-linked companies practice agressive financial reporting due to weak governance, a high incentive to 
maximize compensation and greater agency problems. Conservative reporting found in state-controlled companies 
suggests that managers in these companies might have a lower incentive to inflate earnings because their opportunity 
for better job prospects is limited to the state level.  
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1.  Introduction 
Studies examining the effect of government ownership and control of firms 
reporting behavior are very limited. Extant literature focuses on the impact of government-controlled 
companies on firm performance (Ang & Ding, 2006), value (Lau & Tong, 2008), and earnings 
management (Yen, Chun, Abidin, & Noordin, 2007), but none has examined the level of earnings 
conservatism in these companies.  
holding equity in the private sector, in firms which are also known as Government-Linked Companies 
(GLC). Though the number of government-controlled companies is relatively small, representing less than 
10% of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, these companies account for approximately MYR 260 
billion in market capitalization, or approximately 36% of the Bursa Malaysia market capitalization.  
The performance of GLCs has been under constant scrutiny. Anecdotal evidence shows that the 
government-controlled companies underperformed the broader Malaysian market in respect of all key 
financial indicators except for firm size (PCG, 2005). Recently, Sime Darby Berhad, Malaysia's second-
largest company by market value, lost MYR 964 million (US$ 296m/EUR 240m) on four projects because 
of poor management decisions and control. This shows poor performance by directors in overseeing the 
business operation. Motivated by the significant role played by GLCs in the Malaysian capital market and 
the underperformance of these businesses, this study aims to investigate the reporting behavior of 
managers in government-controlled companies in Malaysia, particularly their practice of earnings 
conservatism. 
2.  Hypothesis Development 
We conjecture that GLCs have unique incentives and demand for conservative reporting of earnings 
compared to widely held companies. First, it is posited that GLCs have poor monitoring mechanisms to 
curb aggressive earnings reporting. Compared to the board of widely held companies, the board of 
directors in government-controlled companies can be considered as weak and ineffective since the 
directors tend to be appointed from the set of persons who have a close relationship to the governing 
political party or who have served as senior government officers. For example, in Sime Darby Berhad, a 
government-controlled firm, six out of the twelve directors have political connections or have served as 
senior government officers. Since the directors lack business experience, the board becomes ineffective 
and unable to monitor ma  
Second, managers of government-controlled companies have a greater tendency to report aggressive 
earnings as a compensation maximization strategy. Unlike in family companies, managers in government-
controlled companies have greater incentives to delay the recognition of bad news to achieve higher 
reported earnings because 
the difference in behavior from other companies may not be significant. Anecdotal evidence shows that 
high-performing managers of government-controlled companies have greater opportunities for career 
development than their counterparts in private firms. For example, Tan Sri Amirsham Abdul Aziz, a 
former CEO of Malayan Banking Berhad, was appointed as the Minister in charge of the Economic 
Planning Unit on March 18, 2008, while Dato' Sri Idris Jala, a former CEO of Malaysian Airlines System 
Berhad, was also appointed as a minister without portfolio in the Prime Minister's Department and CEO 
of the Performance Management and Delivery Unit. Great opportunities for job promotion in 
government-controlled companies, including being appointed to a ministerial position, gives managers 
incentives to report higher reported earnings, in particular by delaying the recognition of bad news and 
accelerating the recognition of good news. 
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Third, government-controlled companies have complex ownership structures and more severe agency 
problems might occur (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) than occur in other companies. This prediction is based 
on the nature of GLCs, where the principal-agent relationship is broken down into two other agency 
relationships because the government acts simultaneously as the principal and agent. It is thus posited that 
the boards of directors of government-controlled companies are weak and ineffective compared to the 
boards of widely held companies because board members are appointed by and are accountable to the 
government, which is also the agent for the public. Since the government and the board of directors are 
also the agent, they themselves have private incentives. From the above arguments, it is posited that the 
managers and directors of government-controlled companies have incentives to opportunistically report 
higher earnings, achieved by delaying the recognition of bad news. This study tests the following 
hypothesis, stated in the null form: 
 
H0: Ceteris paribus, in government-linked companies, accounting earnings incorporate bad 
news and good news in the same way. 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Data 
This study identifies GLCs from two sources. First, we used the list of companies announced by the 
Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance as being government-linked companies (GLCs), or their 
subsidiaries or affiliates, or government-linked investment companies (GLICs). Second, we broadened 
the scope of government-linked companies to include companies that are under direct or indirect control 
of any of the thirteen State Governments. For instance, Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Berhad is a firm 
over which the State Government of Selangor has direct control; hence we classified this firm as a GLC. 
For the control sample, we restrict our sample to widely held companies. We excluded family companies 
from our sample. To determine family companies, we followed Jaggi, Leung, and Gul (2009). When two 
or more members of the controlling family are present on the board, the firm is classified as a family 
company. 
Data for this study were collected from the Datastream and Worldscope databases. We excluded all 
observations with a missing value for any of the variables. We further omitted 100 companies from the 
banking sector (GICS code = 4010), 162 companies from the diversified financial sector (GICS code = 
4020) and 93 companies from the insurance sector (GICS code = 4030). This procedure results in a final 
sample of 1,356 firm-year observations.  
3.2. Measurement for earnings conservatism 
Following the research design of Basu (1997), we use the asymmetric timeliness of earnings model as 
a primary measure for earnings conservatism. In this model, conservatism is defined as the extent to 
which current period accounting earnings asymmetrically incorporate economic losses relative to 
economic gain. Stock return is used as a proxy for economic income as it is assumed that stock prices 
reflect all information from various sources other than financial statements, consistent with evidence that 
stock prices lead earnings information (Kothari and Sloan, 1992). In contrast, accounting earnings impose 
different verification standards for recognition of different types of economic news. For bad news 
(negative stock returns), lower verification standards are used, which results in the immediate recognition 
of losses. However, for good news (positive stock returns), higher verification standards are imposed for 
gains to be recognized in accounting earnings. This approach results in a stronger positive association 
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between bad news and earnings, which suggests a timelier reporting of bad news relative to that of good 
news. 
0 1 2 3    (1) 
 
where E is the earnings per share for the firm; P is the price per share at the beginning of the fiscal 
year; RET is the annual return; RD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
1 measures the response of earnings to returns when returns are 
positive, and 3 measures the incremental response of earnings to negative returns.  
4. Findings 
4.1. Main empirical findings 
To examine differences between earnings conservatism for the companies, we estimated equation (1) 
on two samples: GLCs and widely held companies. Table 1 presents the regression estimates for the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings between the good news and bad news samples. The results show that 
the coefficient for RET in GLCs is positive and significant, implying that GLCs recognize good news in a 
timely manner. For widely held companies, the coefficient for RET is not significant (p>0.10), showing 
no evidence of timeliness of earnings in recognizing good news in those companies. 
The coefficient for RET*RD, which measures the difference or the increment in the timeliness of 
earnings in recognizing bad news compared to good news, is positive and significant in widely held 
companies. This result implies evidence of earnings conservatism in widely held companies. For GLCs, 
the coefficient for RET*RD is not significant, showing no evidence of earnings conservatism in GLCs.  
The evidence from the GLCs 
where in common-law countries companies facing high state involvement in the economy tend to speed 
the recognition of good news and slow the recognition of bad news relative to companies in countries 
with less state involvement. The plausible explanation is that the government might intervene in poorly 
performing government-controlled companies, and managers are inclined to avoid such interference by 
exploiting reporting discretion to portray an optimistic outlook (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). 
Furthermore, government-controlled companies were pressured by the government to upwardly tilt their 
reporting decisions (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006).  
Table 1. Earnings conservatism in GLCs and widely held companies 
Sample GLCs Widely-held companies 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.085* (7.993) 0.047*** (2.185) 
RET 0.082*** (2.422) 0.026 (0.914) 
RD -0.008 (-0.152) 0.006 (0.304) 
RET x RD 0.116 (0.649) 0.343*** (2.464) 
Control Yes  Yes  
Adj.R2 0.21  0.08  
N 234  1122  
F-stat 36.999  10.253  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
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4.2. Earnings conservatism in companies under the control of the federal government and state 
governments 
We further examine whether the previous results differ when the sample is divided into companies 
under the control of the Malaysian federal government and those controlled by the governments of 
. We employed this classification because the monitoring mechanisms for these 
companies vary. For companies under the control of the federal government, Khazanah Nasional monitors 
and assesses the performance of directors. In Malaysia, each GLC must have in place a transformation 
plan to improv he Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance (PCG) 
monitors the transformation plan to enhance the performance of these companies. Companies under the 
control of state governments are managed and controlled through the State Economic Development 
Corporation (SEDC), which has limited resources compared to the Khazanah Nasional. We conjecture 
that different kinds of ownership will create different demands and incentives to report earnings 
conservatively. 
Table 2: Earnings conservatism of companies under the control of the federal government and state governments. 
Sample Federal Government State Government 
Statistics Coeff  t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept -0.213* (-4.578) 0.028 (0.447) 
RET 0.086* (3.380) 0.021 (0.631) 
RD -0.017 (-0.656) 0.040 (0.760) 
RET x RD -0.022 (-0.233) 0.278** (2.014) 
Control Yes  Yes  
Adj.R2 0.41  0.15  
N 132  102  
F-stat 8.479  2.473  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
To examine whether reporting of earnings conservatism varies between different types of government-
controlled companies, we estimated equation (1) for companies under the control of the Federal 
Government of Malaysia and, separately, for companies under the control of State Governments. The 
coefficient for RET*RD in the sample of companies under the control of the Federal Government is not 
significant, implying that companies under the control of the Federal Government do not report earnings 
conservatively. For companies under the control of State Governments, the coefficient for RET*RD is 
significant, showing evidence of earnings conservatism. The analyses show that, in general, companies 
under the control of the Federal Government do not report earnings conservatively. The situation might 
result from the complex principal-agent relationship and poor monitoring mechanisms in companies 
under the control of the Federal Government. Managers of these companies have greater incentives to 
exploit reporting discretion in order to portray an optimistic outlook in order to avoid intervention of the 
government in poorly performing government-controlled companies (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). On 
the other hand, companies controlled at the federal level face greater pressure to upwardly tilt their 
reporting decisions compared to companies controlled by the individual states, because the latter 
companies are smaller in size and have less impact on the general economy.  
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5. Conclusions 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence of the impact of government ownership and control on 
earnings conservatism. This study finds that earnings in GLCs reflect good news received 
contemporaneously, but delay the recognition of bad news. Widely held companies report earnings 
conservatively, where bad news is recognized in a more timely way than good news. These findings 
provide support to the argument that ownership control influences the demands and incentives to report 
earnings conservatively. Since different types of ownership have different key stakeholders who are 
subject to different levels and types of agency conflicts, the incentives to report earnings conservatively 
also vary accordingly.  
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